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Abstract
Background: A traditional pathway for developing new health products begins with public research institutes
generating new knowledge, and ends with the private sector translating this knowledge into new ventures. But
while public research institutes are key drivers of basic research in sub-Saharan Africa, the private sector is
inadequately prepared to commercialize ideas that emerge from these institutes, resulting in these institutes taking
on the role of product development themselves to alleviate the local disease burden. In this article, the case study
method is used to analyze the experience of one such public research institute: the Kenya Medical Research
Institute (KEMRI).
Discussion: Our analysis indicates that KEMRI’s product development efforts began modestly, and a manufacturing
facility was constructed with a strategy for the facility’s product output which was not very successful. The
intended products, HIV and Hepatitis B diagnostic kits, had a short product life cycle, and an abrupt change in
regulatory requirements left KEMRI with an inactive facility. These problems were the result of poor innovation
management capacity, variability in domestic markets, lack of capital to scale up technologies, and an institutional
culture that lacked innovation as a priority.
However, KEMRI appears to have adapted by diversifying its product line to mitigate risk and ensure continued use
of its manufacturing facility. It adopted an open innovation business model which linked it with investors, research
partnerships, licensing opportunities, and revenue from contract manufacturing. Other activities that KEMRI has put
in place over several years to enhance product development include the establishment of a marketing division,
development of an institutional IP policy, and training of its scientists on innovation management.
Summary: KEMRI faced many challenges in its attempt at health product development, including shifting markets,
lack of infrastructure, inadequate financing, and weak human capital with respect to innovation. However, it
overcame them through diversification, partnerships and changes in culture. The findings could have implications
for other research institutes in Sub-Saharan Africa seeking to develop health products. Such institutes must analyze
potential demand and uptake, yet be prepared to face the unexpected and develop appropriate risk-mitigating
strategies.
Background
A traditional pathway for developing new health pro-
ducts begins with public research institutes as genera-
tors of knowledge, and the private sector as the
translator of the knowledge into actual ventures. In the
developed world, for example, early product commercia-
lization – defined as conversion of an idea or technology
to a product or service that generates profits or has an
impact on the lives of everyday people [1] – is driven by
public research institutes and universities [2-4]. Notable
health products commercialized this way include the
Boyer–Cohen “gene-splicing” technique that launched
the biotechnology industry, and diagnostic tests for
breast cancer and osteoporosis [5].
In the developing world, health products developed in
public institutes and then transferred to the private sec-
tor include the first effective meningitis B vaccine, devel-
oped at the Cuban Finlay Institute and licensed to
GlaxoSmithKline [6], and the antimalarial drug arteether
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India’s Central Drug Research Institute and then sold in
dozens of countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, an example
of such a transfer is the sickle cell drug Niprisan, devel-
oped by the Nigerian Institute of Pharmaceutical
Research and licensed to Xechem (see the paper on
Niprisan in this BMC series [7]). Another example is
the appetite-suppressing Hoodia plant, whose active
ingredient was patented and out-licensed by South
Africa’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research [8].
Many deaths due to disease continue to occur in sub-
Saharan Africa, e.g. 90% of the 1 million malaria deaths
and 40% of the 1.3 million TB deaths globally in 2008
were in sub-Saharan Africa [9,10]. Yet less than 10% of
global health R&D expenditures go toward developing
solutions for the developing world, (commonly termed
the 10/90 gap) [11]. This has led to calls for countries
in sub–Saharan Africa to develop their own products as
a way of addressing local health problems [12,13]. Since
public research institutes are still the key drivers of
basic research in sub-Saharan Africa [14,15], and the
private sector is inadequately prepared to commercialize
ideas that emerge from these institutes [16], public
research institutes continue to be important vehicles for
developing health solutions in the African context.
These issues are illustrated by the experiences of the
Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI). KEMRI is
one of Africa’s premier health research institutions, and
successfully advised Kenya’s government to withdraw
the anti-malaria drugs Chloroquine and Daraprim.
KEMRI is also one of the very few research institutes in
Africa that has attempted to commercialize its own
technologies.
We used a case study design. Our analysis is based on
semi-structured interviews and on-site observations that
took place at KEMRI’s Nairobi and Kisumu campuses
during the months of June and July 2008, and subse-
quent visits and interactions over 2008 and 2009 as well
as secondary analysis of peer-reviewed literature, articles,
news items and web sites. We conducted interviews
with informed consent with personnel of KEMRI’s
management, product manufacturing facility, scientific
staff, and IP management team. Representatives of
KEMRI were asked to fact-check the case study; the
analysis and interpretation is our own. All quotes are
from the interviews unless otherwise noted, and with
permission. This study was approved by the Office of
Research Ethics of the University of Toronto.
In this article, we explore the role of public research
institutes in health product development and commer-
cialization by examining the case of KEMRI. We begin
by describing the history of health product development
at KEMRI, discuss its successes and challenges, and sug-
gest lessons for policy makers, donors, institutional
managers, and African scientists.
Discussion
Context
In 1979, two years after the breakup of the East African
Community, the Kenya government established KEMRI
as a state parastatal (government-owned organization)
to fill the health research void caused by the dissolution
of the East African Medical Research Council. Its vision
i st ob eal e a d i n gc e n t r eo fe x c e l l e n c ei nt h ep r o m o t i o n
of quality health, with a mission of improving the qual-
ity of health and human life through research.
Beginning with a staff of five research scientists
located in one centre in Nairobi in 1979, KEMRI has
now grown to over 450 scientists. (See Table 1 for a
timeline of KEMRI.) KEMRI has attempted to commer-
cialize its own technologies by constructing a manufac-
turing facility for diagnostic kits for Hepatitis B
(Hepcell) and HIV (Kemcom). Constructed in 2006, the
production unit had about 20 employees, out of KEM-
RI’s total staff population (including non-scientists) in
2009 of roughly 1250. (Note that when we discuss
KEMRI’s product development experience in this paper,
it is often this production unit and allied units that are
key players, as parts of a much larger organization.)
The Institute has two units and eight research centers
located in Nairobi, while an additional two centers are
located in Kisumu and Kilifi respectively. KEMRI’sm o s t
Table 1 KEMRI timeline
1973 East African Medical Research Institute established (EAMRI)
1979 Kenya Medical Research Institute is formed following dissolution of EAMRI
1990 KEMRON controversy
1998 Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) with KEMRI scientists begins research into diagnostic kits
2004 KEMRI and Japanese scientists develop Hepcell and Kemcom.
2005 Construction of production facility for point of care diagnostics begins
2006 Linkage with Bridgeworks Africa to develop institutional IP policy
2007 Completion of production facility
2008 Launch of TBcide, a chlorine-based decontaminant for handling Mycobacterium.
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at $37.5 million. The sources of funding are as follows;
50% from the Kenyan government, 45% from collaborating
research partners such as major partner Wellcome Trust,
and about 5% from internally generated funds that include
clinical work, diagnostics, and academic services that
KEMRI provides for clients [17]. Because of resource lim-
itations, there is pressure on KEMRI to move from a non-
profit operational model to one where an increasing share
of operations is self-financed.
KEMRI is internationally known for participating in
various programs including clinical research, AIDS vac-
cine development, and conducting clinical trials since
2003 for IAVI (the International AIDS Vaccine Initia-
tive) [18]. It participated in a pan-African research pro-
ject (MARA/AMRA) started in 1996 to map malaria
risk and endemicity, which led to the development of
‘risk maps’ used in malaria control policy activities and
geographical modeling of malaria, enabling the first
accurate assessment of the disease burden in Kenya
[19]. In collaboration with other African research insti-
tutes, KEMRI has reportedly also screened thousands of
small molecules and natural products against schistoso-
miasis, malaria, and tuberculosis through the Helminth
Drug Initiative, helping provide impetus for the new
African Network for Drugs and Diagnostics Innovation
[20].
KEMRI’s commercialization initiatives can be traced
back to August 24, 1990. On this date, KEMRI
a n n o u n c e dt h a ti th a dd i s c o v e r e dac u r ef o rH I V / A I D S
called KEMRON®[21]. Several groups around the globe
that had been involved in developing the product were
reported to be jostling for ownership and distribution
rights [22]. Controversy also arose, with claims that
KEMRON® had undergone uncontrolled clinical trials
and that further testing would be required to validate its
effectiveness [23]. In the US, the case of KEMRON
became political with groups alleging that it was a delib-
erate attempt to stifle African innovation [24,25]. While
this controversy was raging, a new drug called Immuno-
plex-N® was patented for the management of AIDS [26].
KEMRI scientists interviewed believed that Immuno-
plex-N®, now available in numerous countries, has the
same molecule as KEMRON®.
According to one of the scientists interviewed, all this
happened because the institute lacked experience in
innovation management and at that time had no intel-
lectual property policy. The resultant controversy
impeded further interest at KEMRI in research
commercialization.
The early years of product development
T h ei d e at oe n t e rp r o d u c td e v e l o p m e n tr e s u r f a c e di n
t h el a t e1 9 9 0 s ,p r o m p t e dm a i n l yb yf a l l i n gb u d g e t
support by the government and donors, as well as by
the desire to make an impact on society by producing
health products suitable for local conditions. “Prior to
that we were just a typical health research institute
focusing on clinical and basic biomedical research,” says
Dr. Gerald Mkoji, KEMRI’s Deputy Director. A Centre
for Biotechnology, Research and Development was
therefore established which was to focus on product
development.
Early product development related activities included
evaluating products developed in other countries to
assess their quality and suit a b i l i t yf o rt h eK e n y a nm a r -
ket. From KEMRI’s inception, Kenyan health product
regulatory authorities like the Kenya Bureau of Stan-
dards, the National Public Health Laboratories, and the
Pharmacy and Poisons Board would refer some drugs
and diagnostics to KEMRI laboratories for evaluation, to
determine their safety and efficacy prior to registration
on the Kenyan market. According to Dr. Mkoji, KEMRI
scientists soon realized that this focus on efficacy and
safety was too narrow for effective delivery of health
care products to Kenya’s population. Products could be
safe and effective, but not suited to meeting local public
health challenges – their cost might be too high, or they
might require the use of electricity or additional tech-
nology that was not readily available in rural areas.
Consequently, according t oD r .M k o j i ,K E M R Is c i e n -
tists began researching how to adapt products that had
been shown to be effective in other countries, but were
not well-suited for local conditions in their existing
form. Such research focused initially on diagnostics,
though there was also interest in pharmaceutical drugs.
In the process, the scientists acquired skills applicable to
full product development, including assessing market
suitability and requirements.
Technology Transfer from Japan
According to our interviewees, the next step towards
product development came with the construction of a
manufacturing facility. For 25 years, the Japan Interna-
tional Cooperation Agency (JICA) and KEMRI had col-
laborated in areas of parasitic and infectious disease
research. The goal of the collaboration was technology
transfer from Japan to Kenya through training and pro-
duct development. One of the outcomes of this colla-
boration was the development of diagnostic kits.
Prototype blood screening kits were developed in Japan,
and then evaluated at KEMRI and adapted to Kenya.
After ten years of product development and evaluation,
the partnership led to the development of a Hepatitis B
diagnostic kit (Hepcell) for testing blood for transfusion.
Hepcell is based on reverse passive haemagglutination
technology. This technology was ideal for the Kenyan
market, as it was cheaper than transporting blood to
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c o u l db eu s e di nr e m o t ee n v i r o n m e n t sw h e r et h e r ew a s
no electrical power.
For three years, the kits were produced at a small
scale in KEMRI’s laboratory using locally available raw
materials including cell lines, thus making them cheaper.
By 2004, KEMRI had broadened its objectives and began
thinking of moving into commercial production by con-
structing a product manufacturing facility at the insti-
tute. “We started thinking of how we could start
producing our own innovations and moving products to
the market at affordable costs,” says Dr. Wesley Ronoh,
marketing manager.
In order to scale up, a US$5-million manufacturing
facility was constructed. The decision to construct a
manufacturing facility instead of licensing out manufac-
turing was taken since no manufacturing facilities that
could be licensed to existed locally. The facility was
funded with a grant from JICA (the Japan International
Cooperation Agency) and additional funding from the
Government of Kenya. This state-of-the-art facility
opened in 2007 and hosts a current Good Manufactur-
ing Practice (cGMP) certified production unit, labora-
tories, and offices, all with the goal of pushing
diagnostic products to market. The facility is equipped
with ultracentrifuges, high capacity centrifuges, a lyophi-
lizer, a precision spraying machine, a precision guillotine
machine, a high capacity incubator, and an animal
house.
A white elephant?
The manufacturing facility was designed to produce two
types of diagnostic kits: Hepcell kits for detection of
hepatitis B virus, and Kemcom kits for detection of HIV
in the blood (both based on particle agglutination tech-
nology). However, the management of KEMRI soon rea-
lized that there was no institutional mechanism to
engage in commercialization activities. Dr. James
Kimotho was then hired as a Production Manager to
help the institution manage the facility and its innova-
tions. “We then began to think about intellectual prop-
erty [and] commercializing innovations, because after
putting in place the infrastructure, it became necessary
to look and think about moving products to the market
at the lowest price and producing our innovations. As a
result of that, we set up a marketing office and a tech-
nology transfer office, which now began to put in place
the necessary institutional policies for commercializa-
tion,” says Dr. Ronoh.
But in 2008, KEMRI experienced an unexpected set-
back: the Kenyan government, a major customer for the
diagnostic kits produced at the unit, suddenly stopped
purchasing the kits. This was as a result of global World
Health Organization (WHO) recommended changes on
the screening of blood. WHO recommended use of
ELISA based technologies and at the same time discour-
aged use of particle agglutination based technologies for
screening blood in blood transfusion centres. This
resulted in blood screening in Kenya moving from using
particle agglutination technologies to only ELISA based
technologies that were centralized in 5 blood transfusion
centres in the country. The health clinics would no
longer be supplied with KEMRI’s Hepatitis B and HIV
diagnostic kits. In the opinion of Dr. Ronoh, “The insti-
tute suddenly found itself with a white elephant – that
is, it had expensive and excellent facilities that were not
being utilized.”
This setback required a new strategy on how best to
use the facility. One approach was to produce point of
care diagnostics in the form of rapid Hepatitis B & C
and HIV test kits, which are suitable for blood screening
and diagnosis. In contrast to KEMRI’s earlier kits, these
rapid test kits were based on immunochromatographic
technology, and were suitable for adoption as point of
care tests. Prior to the development of domestic kits,
such kits were imported from Japan, Europe, and other
sources by the Ministry of Health. With help from JICA,
technology was transferred to KEMRI. KEMRI scientists
then developed these rapid test kits, and by late 2008
these new kits were being produced at the facility. How-
ever, the facility is still underutilized. The plant’s current
annual revenue is still minimal at about USD $100 000,
while its expenses are estimated to be around USD $50
000. According to Dr. Ronoh, the potential market is
promising as Kenya requires about 2.4 million HIV
rapid test kits a year for use in Voluntary Counseling
and Testing centres (VCTs); if the government was to
approve the use of these kits, KEMRI could earn at least
one million dollars per year.
Technology assessment and institutional IP policy
Dr. Ronoh reported that Bridgeworks Africa (a local
venture capital firm) was involved in technology assess-
ment of potential products. According to him, the first
products were selected on the basis of their market
potential, and included a plant extract for multi-drug
resistant TB; a plant extract for topical application in
the management of Herpes Zoster; a plant extract for
treatment of sleeping sickness; and an existing drug
used for treating cancer which has also shown efficacy
against malaria.
The relationship with Bridgeworks was based on a
confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement negotiated
on a case by case basis with right of first refusal going
to Bridgeworks. Dr. Ronoh reported that due to restruc-
turing at Bridgeworks, this process had stalled around
2 0 0 8 ,a n dt h a tK E M R Ih a di t so w np l a n st od e v e l o pa n
institutional IP tracking system to track its technologies.
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Kenya Intellectual Property Institute (KIPI) assisted in
the development of an institutional IP policy, and in
establishing relationships which resulted in training pro-
grams at international organizations involved in innova-
tion management like theS w e d i s hg o v e r n m e n t
innovation agency (VINNOVA) and the Office of Tech-
nology Transfer of the NIH in the US. Other relation-
ships were with pharmaceutical companies based in
Kenya for product distribution, and with the Kenya
Industrial Research and Development Institute (KIRDI)
which is Kenya’s national incubator. KEMRI also
recruited a legal officer whose duties include negotiating
contracts with partners who want to invest in KEMRI
products.
Product diversification
After the government stopped buying from KEMRI in
2008, KEMRI began to diversify its product portfolio by
instituting changes on how to approach commercializa-
tion. This was done by opening up activities of the mar-
keting department to other areas instead of focusing
only on diagnostics, which resulted in the development
of other products.
TBcide® is a standardized chlorine-based decontami-
nant claimed to prevent occupational exposure when
handling Mycobacterium-infected surfaces. According to
the scientist who developed TBcide®, it eliminates resi-
dual mycobacterium pathogens from surfaces, unlike
many conventional disinfectants [27]; it also has the
advantage of being cheaper than imported disinfectants.
The product was tested in hospitals in Kenya and
patented in 2008 through the Kenya Intellectual Prop-
erty Institute (KIPI) [28]. Inaf i r s tf o rK E M R I ,p r o d u c -
tion was outsourced. According to Dr. Ronoh, a private
firm was identified to produce TBcide® and market the
product on behalf of KEMRI. He stated that the firm
will use KEMRI’s appointed distributor and receive mar-
keting support from KEMRI.
Another product being developed at KEMRI is KEM-
TAQ, which contains a heat-stable DNA TAQ polymerase
that was first isolated from the bacterium Thermus aquati-
cus but is now produced using DNA recombinant technol-
ogy. It is used in Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) to
amplify DNA to adequate quantities that can be handled
or quantified easily. DNA TAQ polymerase is a corner-
stone of molecular diagnostic techniques. The technology
is patented elsewhere but not in Kenya [29]. The process
technology for production has been adapted to local con-
ditions using plasmids and E. coli for expressing TAQ
polymerase that KEMRI scientists have been able to repro-
duce using recombinant technology. It is now being sup-
plied to laboratories in Kenya. All the above products are
listed for ordering online from KEMRI [30].
KEMRI scientists are working with traditional healers
to develop antimalarials isolated from plants at KEMRI’s
Centre for Traditional Medicine and Drug Research
[31]. Dr. Jennifer Orwa, Principal Scientist at KEMRI,
indicated that partnerships have been formed with local
communities for information and supply of these tradi-
tional plant technologies. Memorandums of Understand-
ing have been signed by both traditional healers and
institute scientists, which clearly state prior informed
consent and benefit sharing.
Future plans
According to Dr. Ronoh, KEMRI has been approached
for contract manufacturing by domestic and interna-
tional companies that want to develop health products
for low resource settings – reportedly due to its location
in a tropical country, and facility availability for trial
production of diagnostic technologies. Negotiations are
ongoing with several of these organizations to use the
facility to produce locally adapted diagnostic kits for the
African market.
Dr. Mkoji revealed that one of KEMRI’s potential stra-
tegies is to convert the marketing division into an inde-
pendent enterprise, without abandoning the overall
objective of targeting the poor. Additional funding for
product development might come from income generat-
ing activities of other departments like diagnostic ser-
vices, clinical services, analytical services, training, and
student attachments. Proceeds from these activities
would then be used to support innovation. KEMRI
plans to retain control—and equity—over products by
manufacturing most of them partially or fully in its own
production facility.
KEMRI’s marketing department hopes to compete
internationally, especially in regional economies, by pro-
ducing products that can compete globally. “The first
step is to get WHO accreditation for our manufacturing
facility and products, which we are pursuing,” says Dr.
Ronoh. At the same time, KEMRI is trying to influence
government policy towards health innovation by recom-
mending to the Kenyan government the need to sensi-
tize implementing officers on the importance of
supporting domestic health innovation, by means such
as national procurement strategies for suitable health
products.
In June 2010, the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) reportedly began a business and
strategic assessment of the KEMRI Production Facility,
to evaluate its procurement potential as a supplier of
HIV diagnostics [32].
We turn now to an analysis of KEMRI’s challenges
and business model, and the lessons KEMRI may hold
for future development of health solutions in low-
resource settings.
Simiyu et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights 2010, 10(Suppl 1):S10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/10/S1/S10
Page 5 of 9Barriers to commercialization
Health product innovation does not occur in isolation,
and in sub-Saharan Africa is fraught with many chal-
lenges and barriers that arise from within and outside
the institution [33]. Many of these challenges are a
result of weaknesses in the national innovation system
of the country.
Our analysis revealed that one major challenge for
KEMRI is crossing the “valley of death”:t h er e s o u r c e
gap between R&D activities and commercialization [34].
The absence of private sector investments in biotechnol-
ogy and lack of venture capital in Kenya have negatively
affected the chances of most of KEMRI’sR & Db e i n g
commercialized. Dr. Peshu, Director, Centre for Geo-
graphic Medicine and Research Coast, Kilifi, summar-
ized it as follows, “We have quite a number of products
that have shown activity in vitro, in the lab, but now the
next stage is to demonstrate more evidence that the
products work. The donors are not willing to risk their
research grants, for example, for in vivo studies in ani-
mals – and then, if this succeeds, to clinical trials. They
only support lab studies, so there’s a valley of death so
to speak.”
The lack of a national policy on health innovation in
Kenya was mentioned by interviewees as a factor that
has hampered product development and commercializa-
tion at KEMRI. The overreliance of the government on
donor agencies to fund the Ministry of Health as well as
supply it with imported health products does not encou-
rage domestic innovation. The government of Kenya
does not protect local innovators from foreign competi-
tion, unlike countries like Japan and emerging econo-
mies like India and China [35,36]. According to Dr.
Ronoh, when approached to purchase from KEMRI, for-
eign governments (especially those within East Africa)
and investors question why the Kenyan government
itself is not buying from KEMRI. Part of the problem,
says Dr. James Kimotho, “is that the health sector in
Kenya is classified in the social pillar and not in the eco-
nomic pillar in government development policy docu-
ments, like Vision 2030”. It is therefore not seen as a
potential revenue earner, but as a sector that drains
exchequer funds.
Another barrier to product commercialization was the
culture of “publish or perish” among scientists. One
s c i e n t i s tr e m a r k e dt h a tp r o m o t i o n sw e r ep e g g e dt ot h e
number of publications a researcher produced, regard-
less of their relevance to clinical applications or solving
health problems. This has hindered innovation, as
researchers focused primarily on basic scientific
research. Dr. Ronoh and the staff at the marketing office
began efforts to change the mindset of the scientists,
with the support of training programs offered by Bridge-
works Africa [37]. One weakness identified was that
local universities did not incorporate intellectual prop-
erty knowledge as part of their curriculum for training
scientists.
A final barrier mentioned during the interviews is
managing intellectual property. Despite KEMRI having
its own institutional IP policy and training for scientists,
these efforts have been weakened by existing collabora-
tive agreements with research partners that do not ade-
quately address IP issues. According to Dr. Ronoh,
research collaboration partners have often maintained
clauses entitling them to any IP that comes from a
research project that they have funded. In addition, he
reports that some KEMRI scientists have negotiated col-
laborative arrangements with other institutions and
groups without paying much attention to IP issues, with
the resulting risk that technologies developed from such
collaborations may end up in foreign countries without
benefiting KEMRI scientists. He says that since the
adoption of the institutional IP policy, establishment of
the IP office, and recruitment of a legal officer, all colla-
borative arrangements and agreements are required to
include a section that addresses IP issues.
Implicit open innovation business model
KEMRI does not have an explicit business model. How-
ever, based on our analysis of the interviews, it appears
that the strategy that has evolved to overcome barriers
to commercialization closely resembles an open innova-
tion business model [38]. This model assumes that an
organization can and should use external ideas as well
as internal ideas, and external as well as internal paths
to innovation and market – all while trying to advance
its technology. If an organization lacks internal product
development capabilities, then it can leverage external
resources through a combination of strategies. Conver-
sely, an organization can maximize use of its internal
production capabilities by attracting innovations and
ideas that have been developed outside the organization,
and fully developing them.
In the case of KEMRI, this open innovation business
model has three aspects:
Linking with investors
From our interviews, the management of the marketing
department of KEMRI realized they had limited internal
capacity in product commercialization, especially in
drug production, and turned to outside organizations
for help. KEMRI began exploring outsourcing of some
production functions in 2008 with TBcide®, as described
above. Dr. Ronoh states that KEMRI staff have con-
ducted a GMP audit of local pharmaceutical manufac-
turers so that only GMP compliant organizations will be
selected as partners to produce products on behalf of
KEMRI. The investment from JICA was instrumental in
developing the original manufacturing facility for
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turing may bring in new investors in the future.
Technology assessment
In order to make good business decisions, it is necessary
for an institution to know the potential of the technolo-
gies it has. KEMRI pursued technology assessment of
potential products in partnership with Bridgeworks
Africa. It subsequently formed its own plans to develop
an institutional IP tracking system to track its
technologies.
Managing IP
As discussed above, KEMRI developed an institutional
IP policy and strengthened innovation management cap-
abilities in partnership with a range of external colla-
borators, both African and international. According to
Dr. Kimotho, developing an institutional IP policy is the
f i r s ts t e pt oe n g a g i n ge x t e r n a l investors, and the ability
to negotiate licenses and contracts is critical if an insti-
tution is to maximize benefits and prevent the theft of
IP. He says, “you can’t go into product development
with naiveté. You will be ripped off.” Interviews with
other marketing department personnel indicated that
their department aims to ensure that technologies devel-
oped are patented before discussions are held with
potential investors.
Lessons learned
Our analysis of KEMRI’s experiment with product
development suggests several lessons that may be bene-
ficial for other institutions in sub-Saharan Africa that
are grappling with similar challenges.
Investments in research need to be accompanied by
investments in innovation management
As the case of KEMRI has shown, institutions should
develop their own capacity in innovation management.
“Inventing is one thing. Taking an invention to market
is completely different,” s a y sD r .K i m o t h o .P r o p e ri n t e -
gration of innovation management allows organizations
to validate the science, establish and integrate technolo-
gies, prevent loss of IP, and strengthen business models.
KEMRI is developing its capacity in innovation manage-
ment by sending its staff to participate in local and
international training programs.
Focusing on local markets can generate health benefits,
and rapidly create revenue
Health products that KEMRI has focused on so far are
point-of-care diagnostics, traditional medicines, and dis-
infectants. Most technologies are customized to address
domestic health problems such as malaria, tuberculosis,
HIV, and other neglected diseases. Advantages of local
technologies include their low cost, convenience, and
adaptability to local settings. Both Hepcell and Kemcom
were low cost solutions that were portable, cheap, and
did not require electricity. This strategy has been a
source of revenue and a morale booster to the scientists.
Because product development takes a long time and
most public research institutes in the developing world
face significant shortfalls in finance, it is important to
target areas that will quickly bring in revenues that can
be ploughed back into new products. These revenues
can also be used to purchase more modern equipment
that the organization requires, and to demonstrate
research impact. If sales of health technologies result in
the marketing unit becoming self-sustaining, this may
sway policy makers and management to develop favor-
able policies. KEMRI management is considering making
the production unit autonomous, so that revenues from
it do not have to go to the central institutional pool, but
instead can be invested back into the facility.
Proper strategic planning and risk mitigation strategies are
critical in volatile business environments
The importance of proper planning in product develop-
ment and the ability to adapt to different scenarios can-
not be over-emphasized. Product life cycles can be
short. In addition, product development in the develop-
ing world occurs in highly uncertain environments [39].
KEMRI faced near disaster after building its production
facility because it implicitly assumed that there would
be a guaranteed market. Its experience suggests the
value of engaging with relevant regulatory bodies, and
the value for both governments and research institutions
of supporting strategic local production. Commercializa-
tion strategies need to be incorporated when a product
is still being researched. Proper planning will ensure
that arrangements are in place in case of unforeseen
changes, in both technology and markets. Planning
includes diversification of the product portfolio: KEMRI
diversified from development of diagnostics to develop-
ment of disinfectants against Mycobacterium and
enzymes for DNA amplification.
Public research institutes should be prepared for a long and
difficult process to make health product development work
Research institutes must understand that commercializa-
tion by public institutes is a complex and difficult process
involving many players. While reductions in government
funds and fierce competition for donor grants have
prompted institutes like KEMRI to look for other sources
of revenue, its experience with product development has
not been an easy alternative. In addition, the intricacies
involved in balancing between a public institute’ss o c i a l
mandate and making profit through developing products
can be tricky. “It is very difficult to produce products for
the poor” says Dr. Mkoji. “You have to recover your costs
and make some little profit, yet you must make products
that are affordable, which is difficult”, he adds. Institutes
therefore need to understand that commercialization is
laborious, and they should be prepared to be in it for the
long haul.
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Technological capabilities are critical to product devel-
opment [40]. Local capacity in innovation can be devel-
oped through technology transfer, by first establishing
facilities that produce variants of products from the
developed world. Skills and techniques acquired in these
facilities can then be adapted to similar areas. An exam-
ple of this method of domestic skill development was in
Japan where organizations developed their industrial
capabilities through imitation of foreign technology and
reverse engineering [41]. Local production of Hepcell
and Kemcom diagnostic kits enabled scientists to
acquire skills that could be applied to other diagnostics.
Research institutes should adopt open business models
Literature on technology management shows that orga-
nizations have difficulty managing innovations that they
have no previous experience developing [42]. KEMRI’s
strengths include R&D capacity and capabilities in
developing diagnostics, but it is weaker in other areas
such as drug development. KEMRI has pursued a busi-
ness model that is closely aligned to an open business
model [43], whereby it has tried to commercialize its
own internal technologies, buts o u g h te x t e r n a ll i n k a g e s
and assistance where it lacked capacity. “We have tried
to leverage our strengths, especially in diagnostics devel-
opment, by looking for technologies outside – and tried
to use internal mechanisms to develop them” says Dr.
Ronoh. To solve local health problems, research insti-
tutes need to leverage their strengths while acknowled-
ging their weaknesses. KEMRI has approached this
through linking with investors, outsourcing and licen-
sing, and contract manufacturing.
Summary
This case study of KEMRI reveals the dynamic interac-
tion between institutional factors, external factors, and
product development in a public research institute in
sub-Saharan Africa. In the early years, KEMRI’se x p e r i -
ment with product development was not very successful,
with two key reasons being lack of innovation manage-
ment experience and lack of an institutional IP policy.
Later, KEMRI improved its innovation management and
technological capabilities through recruitment and train-
ing, but these were still inadequate to ensure the success
of its next effort in product development.
Major barriers that KEMRI faced included shifting
markets, lack of scientific and production infrastructure,
inadequate financing for product development, and
weak human capital with respect to innovation. Reliance
on a limited set of products, i.e diagnostics, proved to
be dangerous as that product line relied on government
purchasing. Shortly after construction of a production
unit, the government stopped purchasing diagnostics
from KEMRI, resulting in an underutilized facility.
KEMRI has since diversified its product portfolio. This
has led to limited success in product development, with
a portfolio which now includes a disinfectant and rapid
HIV and Hepatitis B test kits. Given the weakness of
internal capabilities in some areas of product develop-
ment, KEMRI has adopted an open innovation business
model which includes partnerships with other firms.
Internal changes have also been instituted, including
development of an institutional IP policy and programs
promoting a culture of innovation among scientists.
Lessons were identified in the study that could have
implications for other research institutes in Sub-Saharan
Africa seeking to develop health products. These lessons
include: investments in research need to be accompa-
nied by investments in innovation management; institu-
tions may wish to initially focus on local markets to
generate immediate health and financial benefits; a vola-
tile business environment in Africa implies a need for
proper strategic planning; and open business models can
help institutions leverage outside strengths to develop
products. Expert demand analysis and forecasting is also
critical.
KEMRI’s experience shows that with the right policies,
challenges to product development are not insurmoun-
table. Research institutes in Africa can turn science into
health solutions for local health problems, thus reducing
Africa’s health burden.
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